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Abstract 
Numerous studies have reported that countries tend to become more similar to their immediate 
geographic neighbors with respect to democracy. We show that a similar process of mutual 
adjustment can be found within very different international networks: geographically dispersed 
colonial empires, especially those that were founded early and lasted a century or more. The 
causal mechanisms for the diffusion of democracy are notoriously vague, but the existence of 
diffusion within colonial networks helps narrow the possibilities. Where these relationships are 
significant, the net tendency is overwhelmingly convergence: colonies have tended to 
democratize more quickly than similar countries that were never colonies, and some colonizers 
have tended to democratize more slowly than similar countries that never had colonies. We 
distinguish between effects that took place during colonial rule and later relations between 
former colonies and their colonizers. These estimates also confirm, and control for, 
convergence among immediate neighbors, using an electoral democracy index from the 
Varieties of Democracy project, which includes historical democracy ratings for colonies. 
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Introduction 
“No man is an island; some countries are, but even so, no country can be regarded as 
completely self-determined and unaffected by the world beyond its borders” (Coppedge 2012, 
301). This is a widely accepted proposition backed by many empirical studies. Yet, stating that 
countries are in some way affected by external forces only hints at the innumerable possible 
pathways of influence, which have only begun to be explored. This paper builds on Brinks and 
Coppedge (2006), which reported that geographic neighbors tend to converge toward a shared 
level of democracy. Here we expand the focus to colonial networks. We find that colonial ties 
matter only within certain empires, particularly where colonialism lasted the longest, especially 
in the former Spanish and Portuguese empires. Where there has been diffusion, the 
predominant pattern is for colonizers and their colonies to become more similar in their levels 
of democracy.  
Networks are patterns of connections: well-worn paths, channels, or bridges (choose 
your preferred metaphor) linking countries. Many networks are potentially relevant for 
understanding the diffusion of democracy, including geographic proximity, trade, migration, 
alliances, language, religion, and information. This paper tests two kinds of networks: 
geographic neighbors and current and former colonial networks. The reason that neighbor 
networks (the plural is necessary because each country has its own unique network of 
immediate neighbors) matter is unclear because neighbors often share many characteristics – 
language, religion, and an approximate level of development – and because many things flow 
between neighbors – people, goods and services, news and entertainment. Democracy has 
always exhibited strong geographic clustering (O’Loughlin et al. 1998), but it is difficult to know 
whether neighbors have similar levels of democracy because their other shared characteristics 
predispose them to similar democracy levels or because neighboring countries really do 
influence one another (Simmons and Elkins 2004). Brinks and Coppedge (2006) sought to 
distinguish the internal causes of this clustering from international diffusion by controlling for 
likely domestic determinants while testing for a specific pattern of democratization that was 
unlikely to be observed unless countries really did influence one another. Their hypothesis was 
that gaps in democracy levels between countries drive changes within countries. Their results 
were consistent with convergence among neighbors: countries surrounded by more democratic 
countries tended to become more democratic, while those surrounded by less democratic 
countries tended to become less democratic.  
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Although Brinks and Coppedge ruled out domestic determinants shared by neighbors as 
the reason for this tendency, they could only speculate about the causal mechanisms driving 
democratic diffusion. A few studies have yielded clues about causal mechanisms in international 
diffusion by closely examining flows of people and information. Much of this research has 
focused on the diffusion of policies rather than democracy (Brooks 2012, Collier and Messick 
1975, Meseguer 2005, Simmons and Elkins 2004). Keck and Sikkink (1998) explored the 
activities of transnational issue networks driving reforms in developing countries; Madrid (2003) 
revealed that pension privatization owed much to training by technocrats in the World Bank; 
González (2014) documented NGO efforts to train lawyers and judges in international human 
rights law; and Elkins et al. (2012) showed that some constitutional provisions have been 
adopted word for word by other countries. Unfortunately, it is impractical to test for such 
mechanisms systematically on a large scale.1 A complementary alternative strategy is to infer the 
mechanisms from the type of network that channels diffusion. For example, several analyses 
have found some evidence that countries that are linked by trade, investment, or flows of 
information or population tend to have or move toward similar levels of democracy (Rudra 
2005). Levitsky and Way (2006) argue that competitive authoritarian regimes are more likely to 
democratize if they have strong trade, finance, transportation, and information linkages to the 
West (and if the West chooses to exercise its influence). Others have noted that democracies 
tend to form political and military alliances with other democracies and that those alliances may 
reinforce and stabilize members’ political regimes (Layne 1994). Woodberry (2012) argues that 
protestant missions promoted democracy by expanding access to education. Generalizing the 
logic of this strategy, if democracy follows migration patterns, then people probably bring 
democratic (or non-democratic) ideas, norms, institutions, and practices with them when they 
cross borders. If democracy follows trade, then commercial interests probably influence 
democratization. If democracy follows language, then the mechanism probably has to do with 
the flow of ideas, norms, and symbols through books, magazines, television, movies, and now 
the Internet.  
In this paper we examine the diffusion of democracy through colonial networks, i.e., the 
networks linking colonizers to their current and former colonies.2 As Figure 1 illustrates, 
studying colonial rule focuses attention on very different networks than neighbor networks, as 
																																								 																				
1 An exception is Pevehouse (2002), which focused more narrowly on membership in regional organizations, and 
found that the higher the proportion of democratic members of the organization, the more likely other members 
were to become and remain democracies. 
2 We do not count military occupations as colonies. Some of the literature suggests that the distinction between the 
two lies in their intended duration. Although they may end up lasting a long time, occupations are intended to be 
short. Neither the occupier nor the occupied territory has an interest in sustaining the occupation for long, which is 
not necessarily true of colonies (Edelstein 2008). 
	
	
	 3	
colonizers have usually been located far from their colonies. Several different causal 
mechanisms could be relevant in such networks. If there is convergence between colonizers and 
(former) settlement colonies, then the settlers themselves and their ties to the mother country 
presumably play the main role of transmitting ideas, institutions, and norms, as well as a 
common language and sometimes religion to the colony. Even beyond the colonies of 
settlement, however, colonizers and colonies are often linked by language and religion and with 
them, easy access to literature, news, and entertainment. These cultural ties could also 
encourage trade and investment. Colonial elites have often been educated in the colonizing 
country. In some empires, institutions such as courts, elections, and legislatures were 
transplanted to the colonies before independence. The most dramatic forms of influence have 
been economic sanctions and military intervention in former colonies. Such actions reached 
their peak before independence, with the British in India, the Portuguese in Africa, and the 
French in North Africa; but France continues to intervene militarily in its former West African 
colonies, most recently in Mali. 
There are, however, other possible mechanisms that would lead colonizers and colonies 
to diverge in their levels of democracy. Much of the literature on colonialism emphasizes the 
exploitative nature of these relationships (Wallerstein 1974, Cardoso and Faletto 1979, 
Acemoglu et al. 2001, Lange et al. 2006, Mahoney 2010). The motivation for colonization was 
not to spread democracy, but to bring economic benefits to the colonial powers. They, or 
private firms chartered by them, extracted immense mineral wealth from some colonies and 
purchased agricultural products from others at artificially low prices. In order to maintain 
control over colonial territories and populations, colonizers appointed governors who ruled in 
authoritarian and sometimes violently brutal ways. In the colonies of occupation, colonizers 
ruled indirectly through local elites, who thereby became less accountable to their own 
communities. Although France and Portugal considered their colonies overseas territories in a 
unified empire and even granted them representation in the national parliament (when there 
was an elected parliament), both states created a second-class “indigenous” citizenship for 
colonial peoples who were not descended from settlers (Owolabi 2010 and 2012). In the most 
extreme instances, colonizers imported enslaved Africans to provide a workforce for the most 
difficult and dangerous labor. In sum, at a time when Europe was moving slowly and with fits 
and starts from absolute monarchy toward proto-democratic systems, its colonial populations 
were being subjected to profound economic, social, and political inequalities. There are good 
reasons to expect that the net impact of colonial rule may have caused political development in 
Europe and its colonies to diverge. 
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One can think of convergence as the product of “pull” effects and divergence as the 
result of “push” effects. Actions by the center (the colonizer) in the short term to improve 
democracy in the periphery (the colony) constitute a “pull up” effect. For example, the former 
colonizer could use diplomacy, economic sanctions, or invasion to restore a deposed elected 
government. A less inspiring possibility is that “pull down” convergence could happen when a 
colonizer is dragged down by its own colonies, resulting in suppression of protests against the 
cost of maintaining an empire, tensions surrounding immigration from the colonies, or 
rationalizations of brutal repression carried out abroad. This scenario calls to mind DeGaulle’s 
interruption of the French Fourth Republic, precipitated by the costly war in Algeria. But a 
colonizer may push the level of democracy (often already very non-democratic) lower by 
carrying out acts of repression—arresting independence activists, censoring the press, sowing 
divisions among ethnic groups, etc. It is also possible for divergence to result from “push up” 
forces. Colonies may provide a positive example for their colonizers. Some examples could 
include ties between Britain and its former settler colonies (such as the United States, Australia, 
Canada, and New Zealand); or between some democratic Latin American countries and the 
Franco dictatorship in Spain; or between Brazil and the Salazar dictatorship in Portugal from 
1946 to 1963. The flow of ideas, information, and norms may also promote divergence. Citizens 
of the colonizers, repelled by what they have heard about conditions in the colonies, may 
become determined not to allow those practices to happen at home and not to take their rights 
and liberties for granted. They may take more pride in being “civilized” (including being 
democratic) than they would have without colonies.   
Reality, however, is complex. Although there are reasonable arguments for either 
convergence or divergence, there are probably forces pushing and pulling in both directions. 
Whether divergence or convergence dominates depends on whether the pull forces are stronger 
than the push forces in a given case. Where possible, we estimate pressures in both directions 
separately. Furthermore, it is important to realize that divergence does not require the colonizer 
to become more democratic and the colony to become less democratic. Divergence is equally 
consistent with all the countries in a network becoming more democratic or all becoming less 
democratic. The same holds true for convergence: it is a question of the rate of change. For 
convergence to happen, the colonies must democratize faster (on average) than the colonizer. 
This is difficult because the colonizers are moving targets. The colonial powers were not perfect 
democracies throughout our study period (1900-2012). Germany and Italy had fascist 
interludes; Spain and Portugal were usually authoritarian before the 1970s; the Netherlands, 
Belgium, and France were temporarily occupied by Nazi Germany; and the United Kingdom 
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and the United States gradually improved their scores on the V-Dem Electoral Democracy 
Index during the 20th century. In every case, the differences between their lowest and highest 
scores over 113 years are dramatic. If both colonizer and colonies evolved in the direction of 
greater electoral democracy but the colonizer did so more rapidly, we would observe 
divergence. More precisely, as explained below, all of these differences are estimated relative to 
the tendency in a group of control countries that were never colonies or colonizers. 
The dynamics of democracy within networks could follow many patterns, but there are 
good reasons to suppose that the flow of influence is proportional to the gap in democracy 
scores. In a colonial network, for example, if a former colony and colonizer have very similar 
levels of democracy—as in the United Kingdom and Australia, France and Belgium, Spain and 
Chile today—then we expect that neither country exerts much “pressure” to become more 
democratic or less so. But the greater the gap, the more we expect the disparity to matter. The 
gaps are something that people in both societies notice, care about, and comment upon; and 
sometimes, we think, it may move them to action, and those actions may have consequences. 
The core intuition, therefore, is that differences between countries help explain changes within 
countries. It is a process of mutual adjustment that drives either convergence or divergence. 
Our approach is unlike any other in several respects beyond the gap-driven mutual 
adjustment model. First, we use new data on electoral democracy from the Varieties of 
Democracy project (version 5). V-Dem data does not just provide extensive geographic and 
historical coverage; it is the only dataset that measures electoral democracy (and other types of 
democracy) for colonies before independence, which is crucial for this analysis. Second, the 
Electoral Democracy Index we use is constructed from variables measured on a true interval 
scale, unlike most democracy measures, which are ordinal. Interval-level measurement is 
especially important for calculating democracy gaps between countries, as it is meaningful to 
subtract equal-interval values but not ordinal ranks—an advantage that ordinal Freedom House 
data did not afford to Brinks and Coppedge (2006). Third, we operationalize diffusion paths in 
increasingly fine-grained ways. We start by looking for convergence or divergence in center-
periphery and periphery-center relations within each colonial network, past and present, and 
also distinguish between types of colonies. This creates fifty-four possible diffusion hypotheses 
concerning colonies that we test simultaneously.  
These hypotheses are necessary implications of assumptions that four distinctions 
matter for diffusion in colonial networks.  First, as argued above, the direction of the 
relationship matters: centerà periphery vs. peripheryàcenter. This enables us to distinguish 
pulling from pushing forces. Second, we distinguish between current and former colonial 
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networks. (In this paper “current” means that the unit was a colony in the year of a given 
observation in the dataset. It does not mean that the unit is a colony today. This is analogous to 
“current dollars” in economics: it refers to dollar values in the past rather than what the 
present-day values are.) Third, we expect that relationships may be different across the nine 
colonial networks—Belgian, British, Dutch, French, German, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish, and 
U.S.3 Each colonizer governed in a different way, and each colonizer underwent a distinct 
process of democratization at home during its colonial rule period, so we prefer not to assume 
that the relationship between colonial rule and democratization was the same in all colonial 
empires. Fourth, there seems to be relative consensus in the literature that colonies vary in their 
degree of control (Fieldhouse 1981, Mahoney 2010, Abernethy, 2000). Although we consider 
colonial protectorates, mandates, and trusteeships all to be colonies, for the four largest 
networks (British, French, Spanish, and Portuguese), we make a distinction between types of 
colonies: settlement (voluntary migration from the colonizing state), forced settlement (forced 
migration of slaves) and occupation (control of indigenous populations) (Owolabi 2010 and 
2012). The smaller empires are treated as all having had colonies of occupation. 
With 2 directions times 2 periods times 9 empires times 3 types of colony, there are 
potentially 108 colonial hypotheses, but historical patterns and missing data reduce the number 
we can test to 54. For example, there are no current Spanish colonies after 1900, except for 
Equatorial Guinea, which is omitted from the V-Dem dataset.  Our final model reports what 
we regard as the best estimates: tendencies in both directions, for current vs. former colonies, 
within each colonizer’s network, and for different types of colony where applicable. We also 
correct for selection bias to ensure that countries that became colonizers or colonies are 
comparable to countries that did not. The more carefully we model these diffusion 
relationships, the more stable they become. The final analysis supports the conclusion that 
convergence prevails in the longest-lasting colonial networks. Where colonial rule has had a 
significant impact on democratization, the gaps between colonizers and colonies have tended to 
increase the democratizing trend in the colonies or slow it down in the colonizers, compared 
with the trends in otherwise similar countries that have not belonged to colonial networks.  
  
  
																																								 																				
3 Japanese “colonies” are all treated as temporary military occupations rather than colonies in the sense that we use 
here. We do not count treat polities dominated or absorbed by Russia or the Soviet Union as colonies. 
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1. Varieties of Democracy  
We use version 5 of the V-Dem dataset from January 2016.4 The sample is observational but it 
is very large, encompassing 171 countries from 1900 to 2012, or whenever they existed during 
this period, for a maximum of 15,227 country-year observations.5 Most of the data come from 
online surveys of 2,156 country experts, the majority of whom were nationals of or residents in 
the countries they coded. The online questions were typically coded by five experts whose 
ratings were aggregated to country-date ratings by a Bayesian latent-variable measurement 
model.6 
The dependent variable, the Electoral Democracy Index, is an index constructed from 
36 fine-grained variables that measure freedom of association, suffrage, clean elections, elected 
executive, and freedom of expression.7 The V-Dem dataset contains indices of other varieties of 
democracy—liberal, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian—but we chose electoral 
democracy as a first step in order to maximize comparability with other research on diffusion, 
most of which uses Polity and Freedom House indices, which conform most closely to a 
concept of electoral democracy. Our index correlates at 0.898 with Polity and .908 with the 
Freedom House indices, which assures us that we are not measuring an entirely different 
concept.8 Nevertheless, we believe that V-Dem data are more valid in the sense that they take 
many more attributes of electoral democracy into account. We also believe that the data are 
more reliable because they are based on multiple ratings by thousands of raters who know their 
																																								 																				
4 Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) is an international research collaboration with institutional homes at the 
Varieties of Democracy Institute at the University of Gothenburg and the Kellogg Institute for International 
Studies at the University of Notre Dame. The Principal Investigators are Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan 
I. Lindberg, and Svend-Erik Skaaning. A complete list of the dozens of Project Managers, Research Fellows, 
Project Coordinators, Regional Managers, and Country Coordinators who have made essential contributions to the 
project is available on the main project website, https://v-dem.net.  
5 Most of the omitted countries are microstates in the Pacific, Persian Gulf, and the Caribbean.  
6 The measurement model was designed by Daniel Pemstein and others and executed using high-performance 
computing at Sweden’s SNIC and the Center for Research Computing at the University of Notre Dame (Pemstein 
et al. 2015). Some variables—the relatively objective ones—were coded by research assistants and thoroughly 
validated, and the dataset also contains some variables that were recoded from outside sources such as the 
Comparative Constitutions Project (Elkins et al. 2012). 
7 V-Dem data also make it possible to disaggregate electoral democracy into several components and many specific 
variables, which may help identify more precisely which aspects of electoral democracy diffuse. The components of 
this index were first transformed to 0-1 interval with a cumulative density function. Thus, high values are high with 
respect to all country-years from 1900 to 2012. Given the size of the sample, this is an excellent estimate of the full 
range of possible variation. However, the CDF tends to compress values near the top and bottom of the scale, 
compared to the point estimates from the measurement model. 
8 The Electoral Democracy Index used in this paper is: .1*Suffrage Index + .1*Clean Elections Index + .1*Elected 
Executive Index + .1*Freedom of Association Index + .1*Freedom of Expression Index + .5* Suffrage Index * 
Clean Elections Index * Elected Executive Index * Freedom of Association Index * Freedom of Expression Index. 
For a detailed description see Coppedge et al. (2015a) and Coppedge et al. (2015b).  
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countries well, and because coder disagreements have been reconciled by a state-of-the-art 
custom-designed IRT model.9  
 
2. Operationalizing Diffusion Hypotheses 
Many studies have operationalized diffusion by including regional dummy variables or the mean 
democracy level in a region among their explanatory variables (Bollen 1983, Hadenius 1992, 
Lipset et al. 1993; Mainwaring and Pérez Liñán 2013, Przeworski and Limongi 1997). Studies of 
the impact of colonial rule on democratization typically use dummy variables as well. 
Colonialism is usually operationalized simply as a series of dummy variables for having been 
colony of the United Kingdom, Spain, France, or other powers, and this is used to predict how 
democratic a country is, whether it is democratic, or how likely it is to become democratic or to 
break down (Barro 1999, Bollen and Jackman 1985, Burkhart 1997, Gassebner et al. 2009, 
Lipset et al. 1993, Muller 1995). Sometimes the length of colonial rule or the years elapsed since 
independence are factored in. One of the best studies, Bernhard et al. (2004) found that, among 
former colonies, democracy is more likely to survive in former Spanish and British colonies, 
especially those that spent more time under British rule. This and several other studies have 
reported worse prospects for democracy in former Belgian, Dutch, Portuguese, and sometimes 
French, colonies. However, dummy variables are too blunt to distinguish external influences 
from shared domestic ones such as language, religion, or level of economic development.  
We conceive of democratic diffusion as a pattern of mutual adjustment in the levels of 
democracy within any network of countries. Each country has a level of democracy – in this 
analysis, electoral democracy. Each country is both a source of influence on other countries and 
a target of their influence. There is a gap between each target country’s level of democracy and 
the level of democracy in the source countries in its network (Most and Starr 1990). These gaps 
drive the diffusion process in either a negative or a positive direction. If there is positive 
diffusion, there is convergence because either the more-democratic countries pull the less-
democratic countries up toward greater democracy or the less-democratic countries pull the 
more-democratic countries down to their level, or both. Logically, this process would continue 
until all the countries in the network converged at the same level, where the democracy gaps 
would all be zero. Negative diffusion is also possible: more-democratic countries could push 
less-democratic countries down toward even less democracy, or less-democratic countries could 
																																								 																				
9 The measurement model also provides confidence intervals for most V-Dem variables. Eventually it will be 
possible to incorporate those measures of uncertainty into the kinds of regression estimates reported here, but we 
have not attempted this yet. 
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push more-democratic countries up toward greater democracy. Negative diffusion would 
therefore lead to divergence within the network.   
Unlike most of the literature on colonial rule and democracy, much of which relies on 
cross-sectional analysis to test hypotheses about the relationship between present-day 
democracy and a distant colonial past, our attention is confined to the short-term effects of 
these gaps. Specifically, we test for relationships between the democracy gap two years prior 
and the change in democracy during the two subsequent years. Because the dependent variable 
is differenced, our models ignore all earlier characteristics of the target country as explanations 
for the present. The gap in 1950 still matters for explaining the situation in 1952, but the gap in 
1950 is hypothesized to have no direct effect on change in 1953, much less 2012.  
We test diffusion hypotheses by creating a series of variables that measure how much 
we would expect electoral democracy to change in each country, in each year, if each diffusion 
hypothesis is true. The variables operationalizing each diffusion hypothesis become predictors 
in a series of regressions. Their coefficients reveal how much each diffusion network 
contributes to democratization. Since we are interested in making inferences about convergence 
and divergence of electoral democracy, we first calculate what we call electoral democracy gaps. 
The gaps are between “source” countries and “target” countries. A source country is one that is 
theorized to have an effect on other countries in the same network. A target country is one that 
is theorized to be affected by the source country or countries. The electoral democracy gap is 
simply the source country’s electoral democracy score, Djt, minus the target country’s electoral 
democracy score, Dit, calculated for every country-year. In the formula for the gap equation, Gijt 
is the difference in electoral democracy scores between each target and source country at time t:  
 !!"# = !!" − !!" 
	
The final steps in the construction of the network variables are to multiply the corresponding 
electoral democracy gap between each pair of countries by a network weight, yielding a pairwise 
network gap, and to add them up over all source countries j as follows:  
 !"#$%&' !"#$ℎ!"# !"#!" = (!!"# × !!"#)!  
 
Gijt is the democracy gap between two countries in a given year, n is the number of source 
countries in the network, and Wijt is the corresponding network weight.  
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The first diffusion variable we test captures neighbor networks. Neighbor weights aim at 
capturing spatial effects affecting diffusion. For the neighbor network, “weights” may be a 
misleading term because they are binary: either a country is a neighbor (weight=1) or it is not 
(weight=0). To define neighbors we use the criteria of proximity used in Brinks and Coppedge 
(2006).  Countries on continents are neighbors if they share a border; Australia is counted as an 
island, rather than a continent. If an island is close to a continent, its neighbors are the closest 
neighbor on that continent and any island nations in between. If an island is about equally close 
to any continent, or to multiple countries on the same continent, it has as neighbors all nearly 
equally close mainland countries and any islands in between. If an island is not close to any 
continent it has as neighbors islands within 150 percent of the nearest neighbor.  Neighbor 
dyads are undirected. That is, if country A is a neighbor of country B, then country B is also a 
neighbor of country A, with the exception of island nations. The formula for calculating 
democracy gaps weighted by neighbor networks is 
 !"#$ℎ!"# !"#$%&'!" =  1!!" !!"# × !!"#!  
 
Nijt is a dummy variable that identifies whether countries i and j are neighbors at time t, Gijt is 
the electoral democracy gap at time t, and nit is the total number of country i’s neighbors at time 
t.  
 
Colonial network weights 
To test our hypotheses about diffusion in colonial networks, we construct colonial network 
weights. Unlike most studies of the impact of colonial rule, ours focuses narrowly on short-term 
relationships. We do not make claims about any legacies of colonial rule that have become 
permanent features of the former colonies or that took decades to unfold. An analysis of long-
term effects would call attention to structural economic and social transformations such as 
impoverishment, social inequalities, past genocide, or a changed culture. Such transformations 
are undoubtedly relevant for understanding the full effects of colonial rule, but they are not the 
subject of our analysis. Instead, we test only hypotheses about (1) the existence of colonial 
networks linking countries and (2) the relevance of democracy gaps within each network during 
two-year moving windows. 
We expect these networks to be most relevant while colonial rule is still going on, but 
we also expect some persistence after independence. The United Kingdom no longer rules 
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India, but even after 1947 they continue to share a language, which eases communication and 
the exchange of news and entertainment; some cuisine; population flows; trade; and many other 
ties. Our hypothesis is therefore that there is more mutual influence between this former colony 
and its colonizer than there is between, for example, India and Spain, or the United Kingdom 
and Mozambique. We have the same expectations for countries in the Spanish, French, 
Portuguese, Dutch, Belgian, Italian, German, and U.S. colonial networks.  
The reason for this narrow focus on short-term change within colonial networks is that 
it improves causal inference. If we tested only for differences in the mean level of democracy 
across various colonial networks, as is done by all studies that simply include a dummy variable 
for former colonies, then it is hard to attribute any difference to colonial rule, as opposed to the 
dozens of other differences these groups of countries have had during the intervening decades, 
with respect to economic development, cultural heritage, geography, and war, among others. 
But by explaining short-term change within each country, we rule out as confounders the many 
characteristics of that country that did not change in the same interval. We also rule out cross-
national differences that could be incautiously interpreted as equivalent to change within 
countries. Any relationships over multiple countries and many years between short-term 
changes in democracy, on the one hand, and gaps in democracy within networks, on the other, 
are very unlikely to have competing interpretations. There is, admittedly, a price to pay for such 
precise inferences: they end up ignoring some possible relationships that many scholars 
associate with colonial rule.  
We used information in the V-Dem Country Coding Units document to define colonies 
(Coppedge et al. 2014). We coded these networks for the period from 1900 to 2012. A network 
weight of 1 represents the existence of a relationship for the two corresponding countries in a 
given year, and 0 represents the absence of such relationship.10 For centeràperiphery networks, 
the colony is the target country, its colonizer is coded as its source country, and all the other 
colonies in the same empire in the same year have the same colonizing source country. For 
peripheryàcenter networks, the colonizer is the target country and all of its colonies in a given 
year are its source countries.11 Because colonizers have tended to be more democratic than their 
colonies, the democracy gaps tend to be positive for center-periphery networks and negative for 
periphery-center networks. However, there are exceptions to this, as between Franco Spain and 
some Latin American countries or between the Salazar dictatorship and Brazil in some years. 
																																								 																				
10 We refer to these variables as “weights” because in trade, migration, religious, and other networks, they take on 
fractional values. Colonial and neighbor networks are special cases in which a country either is or is not a member 
of the network. 
11 In previous analyses (not presented here) we tested the relationship between occupations as well as colonies and 
diffusion of electoral democracy and we found no significant effect.  
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We calculate expected changes in three or four steps: 1) calculating network weights; 2) 
calculating electoral democracy gaps; and 3) multiplying the two to get the magnitudes of the 
electoral democracy gaps in each network. For one-to-one relationships, such as the impact of a 
colonizer on each of its colonies, this is the end of the calculation. The formula for the center-
periphery weights is 
 !!" !!"# − !!"#  
 
because these are one-to-one relationships for every dyad-year. Met is a dummy for membership 
in the colonial network of empire e at time t, DCet is the Electoral Democracy score for the 
colonizer in empire e at time t, and DPit is the Electoral Democracy score for colony i at time t. 
For the many-to-one relationships such as the impact of colonies on a single colonizer, there is 
a fourth step: calculating the mean electoral democracy gap between the colonizer and all of the 
colonies in that network. The formula for the periphery-center weights is therefore 
 !!!" !!" !!"# − !!"#!!"! . 
 
because the gaps between a colonizer and all of its colonies must be averaged. Net is the number 
of colonies in empire e at time t. 
 
Controls  
We include several control variables in the analysis. Presidential election (v2xel_elecpres) is a 
dummy for a presidential election taking place in a given year. We include this because we 
consistently find that democracy scores tend to change more at the time of these high-profile 
events. We also control for year dummies in order to minimize the risk of confounding by 
period effects. Without them, the risk is that diffusion variables that are relevant only for certain 
historical periods might capture a trend associated with those periods rather than real diffusion 
effects. For example, the electoral democracy scores of both some colonies and several 
colonizers rose during the second wave of democratization following World War II, and this 
trend was soon followed by decolonization. Controlling for mean electoral democracy levels in 
these years helps keep these processes separate. Finally, for one of the baseline models, we use 
the natural log of per capita gross domestic product, which 
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of data from Maddison (2001) using GDP per capita PPP in constant 2005 international dollars 
from the World Bank (2013).  
Because the GDP per capita measure reduces our sample by over 7000 country-years 
and does not include colonial territories prior to 1960, we use the adult literacy rate as a proxy 
for economic development.12 Many have argued that literacy has a relationship with economic 
development, as increased levels of literacy and schooling produce higher levels of human 
capital inside a country (Blaug 1966, Barro 1991, Benhabib and Spiegel 1994). The country can 
then convert human capital into tangible economic growth. Our measure of literacy is the adult 
literacy rate, which measures the percentage of the population age 15 or older who are 
literate. We use the percent literate variable from Vanhanen (2003) and merge it with the World 
Bank’s (2016) adult literacy variable for country-years not covered by Vanhanen. Both variables 
measure the adult literacy rate in the same percentage format. Many colonizers kept records of 
the literacy rate and education in their colonies, which gives greater data coverage for the 
literacy variable. Since both data sources have gaps in their coverage of the literacy rate, 
however, we interpolated the data after they were combined into one measure. After 
interpolation, the literacy variable has 7000 more observations than the GDP per capita 
measure and covers almost all of the colonial cases we are interested in. Our interpolated adult 
literacy variable is highly correlated with the natural log of GDP per capita with a correlation of 
.73, suggesting that it is an adequate proxy for economic development.13 
 
3. Estimation and Findings 
The models 
Our models make a strenuous effort to approximate causal inference by ensuring that 
coefficient estimates are based on comparisons of cases that are as similar as possible. First, 
these are fixed-effects estimates with random intercepts, meaning that all variables are 
transformed into deviations from country means, with an independent intercept for each 
																																								 																				
12 While using the GDP per capita measure reduces our sample size, we ran the baseline model using the adult 
literacy rate, the natural log of GDP per capita, and both at the same time to illustrate the usefulness of the adult 
literacy proxy. In the online appendix, we also ran the main mixed effects model substituting GDP per capita for 
adult literacy rate and our results largely remain the same. 
13 To ensure that using the adult literacy variable as a proxy for economic development did not drive our results, 
we also ran our model with an alternative proxy, urbanization. Urbanization is another factor argued by Lipset 
(1959) and others that promotes democratization through modernization and economic development. The 
urbanization measure is the ratio between urban population and total population (Coppedge et al. 2015). The urban 
population and total population measure used to construct the urbanization variable are interpolated and use 
multiple imputation to cover the full dataset. We re-ran the main mixed effects model with the urbanization 
measure instead of literacy as a control and included the results in the online appendix. The results largely remain 
the same (Figures A9-A12). 
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country. Each country is therefore compared only to itself; given the thousands of attributes 
that make each country unique, no other country could be equally similar. Although fixed-
effects estimation has been a familiar tool in econometrics for decades, it accomplishes much of 
what is promised by the differences-in-differences tests that are now common in the causal 
identification literature (Katz 2014). Second, we difference the dependent variable by two years. 
Because of the aggressive modeling of time (the two-year differenced dependent variable and 
the year dummies), values of the dependent variable hover close to zero for most country-years, 
but they are punctuated by spikes in the years of large changes in electoral democracy. When 
the same controls are partialed out of the diffusion variables, they also become flat series 
punctuated by spikes. Our model therefore, in effect, tests for temporal associations between 
these spikes: if there is a spike in the electoral democracy gap between two countries in one 
year, do changes in the electoral democracy score in the target country also tend to spike in the 
following two years? We use a two-year difference and a two-year lag because we do not expect 
a democratization process in one country to be immediately responsive to a democracy gap with 
another country. It should take time for influential actors in the target country to take stock of a 
changed situation, to formulate a response, and to organize people and resources to bring about 
a change. Because there is uncertainty about exactly how long the lag should be, we also tested 
one-year and three-year reaction times; those, which are very similar, are reported in the online 
appendix (Figures A3-A6). 
The coefficients for the diffusion variables should be interpreted as the difference 
between, on the one hand, belonging to a given network and having a gap of a given magnitude, 
and on the other hand, not belonging to any of the networks specified in the model.  In the case 
of colonial networks, the reference group for these coefficients is the set of countries that have 
never been colonizers and are not either a current or former colony.14 The typical rich reference 
countries are in Scandinavia; the typical poor reference countries are the Central Asian “-stans.” 
Causal inference requires comparing the countries “treated” by various kinds of colonization to 
a control group that is as similar as possible to the treatment group in every way except for the 
treatment. This makes it possible to estimate the average treatment effect.  
Because the reference group here is a little more democratic, richer, more populous, and 
smaller in land area than the countries in colonial networks, we take the further precaution of 
																																								 																				
14 The reference countries are Afghanistan, Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, China, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, Georgia, German 
Democratic Republic, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Kazakhstan, North Korea, South Korea, Kosovo, 
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liberia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Nepal, Norway, Poland, 
Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Thailand, 
Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Yemen.  
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correcting for the probability of being “selected” as a colonizer or “selected” as a colony.15  The 
process of colonization was not randomly assigned to territories, and thus the distribution of 
colonizers and colonies throughout the world could have been determined by various 
characteristics that either allowed for colonization or inhibited colonization. Controlling for this 
form of selection bias helps create more conservative estimates of the diffusion effects, as it 
takes into account this non-random assignment of colonization. To correct for this bias, we 
follow the two-step Heckman selection procedure (Heckman 1979). First, we produce two first-
stage probit models that predict the probability of being either a colonizer or a colony (see 
Table A1 and Figures A1 and A2 in the online appendix). For the colonizer selection probit, we 
estimate the probability of a country being a colonizer based on distance from the equator, 
whether the country is an island, the average elevation of the country (Gallup et al 1999), the 
year the country enters the dataset, and whether the country had been a great power at any time 
since 1815 (Levy 1981).16  For the colony selection probit, we similarly estimate the probability 
of a country having been a colony or a part of a colonial territory based on distance from the 
equator, percentage of the country in the tropics (Gallup et al 1999), the average elevation of 
the country, whether the country is an island, whether the country neighbors a colony, and 
whether the country was a great power at any time since 1815.  Both models fit our data well 
and for the most part accurately predict whether a country is more or less likely to be a colony 
and whether a country is more or less likely to be a colonizer. After producing the probit model 
predictions, we calculate the inverse Mills ratios for both the colonizer and colony selection 
models and produce two selection variables to help control for selection bias in the model.17 
The estimates from both selection models are included in the appendix. 
To calculate the diffusion effects of the networks using cross-sectional selection 
variables in a fixed-effects model, we utilized mixed-effects regression with the two selection 
variables serving as random slopes in the model. We re-estimate the models using the inverse 
																																								 																				
15 Unlike Brinks and Coppedge (2006), this first-stage probit model does not correct for selection bias that could 
be due to factors that inhibit countries from changing. We have estimated such a model (adapted to our 
continuous dependent variable), and it yields some interesting conclusions about the conditions under which 
countries change their level of electoral democracy more than an insignificant amount. However, this correction 
does not significantly or substantively alter estimates in the main model, probably because we use a continuous 
rather than ordinal variable and because the differenced dependent variable controls for stasis very well.  
16 Since the traditional measures of state material power does not cover the countries and years of our dataset, we 
use a dummy variable for great power status since 1815 to capture the dynamic of state power since 1815 in 
predicting colonization by a country, assuming a certain level of material power is necessary to colonize foreign 
lands. The first year in the dataset variable helps determine whether the country was in existence during the 
colonial period. It helps control for the entrance of new countries into the dataset following the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, and other secessionist events, which are distinct from the decolonization process.  
17 The formula for calculating the inverse Mills ratios is as follows: λ!(−!!!) =  !( !!!)!(!!! ) where ! =the standard 
normal probability density function and ! =the standard normal cumulative distribution function. 
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Mill’s ratios we calculated with the two selection probits as random slopes in this model. By 
applying this selection method we achieve more conservative estimates about diffusion effects, 
as it helps control for the non-random nature of becoming a member of a colonial network. 
Instead of estimating only the effect of diffusion within a colonial network, the probability of 
being selected into that network is also taken into account. This helps eliminate potential 
confounding factors that simultaneously push countries to become part of a colonial network 
and operate among colonial network members. Using this modeling technique increases our 
confidence that that there is a distinct diffusion effect, as opposed to a byproduct of the 
selection process that led to the creation of the colonial network.  
Because the composition of the reference group is crucial for causal inference, it is 
important to specify the diffusion variables in a comprehensive and balanced way. That is, all of 
the country-years affected by colonization, either as colonizers or as colonies, current or former, 
must be represented by a diffusion variable in the model. If they are not, the omitted country-
years fall back into the reference group and therefore modify the nature of the average 
treatment effect. For example, if one were to test for just the effect of being, or having been, a 
British colony, then the average treatment effect would be the difference between British 
colonies, on the one hand, and the core reference group and colonies in other empires and 
Britain itself and other colonizers. The correct specification is to include variables that cover all 
the empires and the colonizers as well. Similarly, estimating relationships only for former 
colonies and colonizers relegates current colonies and colonizers to the reference group, 
changing the effect to the difference between former colonies and colonizers, on the one hand, 
and the non-colonial reference group and current colonies and colonizers—a very different 
relationship. No previous study has ever specified colonial models this fully, because only the 
new V-Dem dataset measures electoral democracy for colonies before independence. Fully 
specifying the colonial diffusion model is essential for drawing conclusions about the effect of 
colonial networks versus the non-colonial reference group and the differential effect of each 
type of colonial network versus all the others, as they are all compared to the same non-colonial 
reference group. 
Table 1 presents seven baseline models without any diffusion or selection variables. 
Model 1 takes advantage of the largest possible sample. Model 2 controls for the best-known 
correlate of democracy, per capita GDP (logged), but in the process sacrifices nineteen 
countries and more than five thousand country-year observations due to listwise deletion.18 
Model 3 includes the neighbor network control variables. Models 4 through 7 repeat the same 
																																								 																				
18 We plan to eventually incorporate multiply imputed estimates to avoid the reduction in the sample and any 
sample bias that it may bring, but these baseline models suggest that there is no cause for concern.
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pattern but include the adult literacy control variable. Even with the smaller samples, the 
estimates are virtually identical for all the model specifications. Presidential election year and 
adult literacy are significant and positive in every model specification, indicating that higher 
levels of adult literacy and presidential election years predict positive changes in democracy 
levels. GDP per capita is surprisingly never significant in any model specification. From this 
point forward we control for literacy rather than per capita GDP in order to take advantage of 
the maximum sample size, which also allows us to include colonial experiences that occurred 
before the starting point of our GDP data series. However, all of the other baseline variables 
are included in the model even though they are omitted from the coefficient plots below. 
 
Results 
Neighbor networks are positive and significant, confirming previous work reporting that 
neighbors converge to the same level of democracy. This is true even though Brinks and 
Coppedge used Freedom House data from 1972 to 1996 and we use V-Dem’s Electoral 
Democracy Index from 1900 to 2012. Although the coefficient of 0.088 looks small, it is large 
enough to produce strong convergence when compounded over several years, especially if the 
initial democracy gap is large. 
Each of the models presented in the previous section estimates diffusion effects in the 
center-periphery direction and the periphery-center direction for each of nine empires. The four 
largest empires—British, French, Spanish, and Portuguese—are further divided into colonies of 
settlement, colonies of forced settlement, and colonies of occupation. This produces 54 
coefficients to report. Given space constraints, we highlight the most general tendencies and a 
few interesting exceptions. Because all the colonial networks are included in these models, and 
because we control for selection into the set of colonizers and the set of colonies, all the effects 
we report should be interpreted as differences in the rate of democratization between (a) the 
target countries in each network and (b) similar countries that had never had a colony or been a 
colony. Using observational data, this specification comes as close as possible to the average 
treatment effect of having colonies in a given empire or being a colony in that empire. 
Figures 2 and 3 display the coefficients and confidence intervals for periphery-center 
and center-periphery, respectively. Figure 3b contains the periphery-center coefficients 
excluding the coefficient for the current Portuguese colonies, as the size of that coefficient 
makes it difficult to judge the magnitude of all the other coefficients. Despite a large sample size 
of over 13,000 observations in which one would expect almost every variable to be significant, 
half of the center-periphery and two-thirds of the periphery-center coefficients are not 
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statistically significant.  This lack of significance is a reassuring sign that our estimates are 
conservative.19  
What determines which coefficients are significant? We see two patterns. First, more of 
the significant influence flows from the colonizers to the colonies than in the reverse direction. 
This is what one would expect, given that (a) colonizers had more economic and military power 
than their colonies, and (b) the large British, Spanish, French, and Portuguese empires 
contained a diverse array of colonies that were less likely to change democracy levels at the 
same time. Their average democracy gap with their colonizers were therefore less likely to send 
a clear diffusion signal to the center. It was less likely that the center would respond to many 
conflicting signals from its periphery than that colonies in the periphery would respond to a 
clear signal from the center. 
A second pattern is that the older, more established colonial networks are more likely to 
have a significant impact than the more recent and short-lived networks. The Spanish empire 
lasted more than three centuries, and all six of its coefficients are significant. The Portuguese 
governed Brazil for more than 300 years and parts of Africa for more than 400 years, and four 
of the nine coefficients for its empire are significant. The Dutch ruled their territories in the 
East Indies for nearly 150 years, and half of these coefficients are significant. Sixty-two percent 
of the French empire coefficients are significant, corresponding to rule of more than sixty years 
in Indochina and West Africa, seventy-five in Tunisia, and 132 in Algeria (although only 28 in 
the Congo). In contrast, only one out of three coefficients are significant for the Italian, 
German, and Belgian empires. Although Belgium ruled the Congo for 75 years, the United 
States governed the Philippines for 46 years; Italy was in Libya, Ethiopia, and Somaliland only 
32-47 years; and Germany ruled present-day Rwanda and Burundi and Southwest Africa only 
28-35 years. The outlier here is the British empire, which ruled India for 335 years, the Bahamas 
for 255, Nigeria for 160, Malaya for 133, the Gold Coast for 131, and Burma for 124 (although 
Kenya for only 25 years and Egypt for just eight). If long colonization increases the chances of 
a significant effect, we should observe more significant relationships in the British empire, yet 
only two of eight networks are significant. However, all of Britain’s colonies of settlement (the 
United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) achieved or exceeded British levels of 
democracy before entering our sample in 1900. Their democracy gaps are therefore too small to 
matter. Britain itself had a slow, gradual pattern of democratization in the 20th Century, aside 
from the suffrage expansion after World War I. Its evolution was not sufficiently dynamic to 
generate decisive tests for the colonies of forced settlement, in the British West Indies, which 
																																								 																				
19 Preliminary models yielded estimates that were very sensitive to specification. The multilevel corrections for 
selection bias we now use yield more robust estimates, but at the cost of rendering more of them non-significant. 
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followed a similar pattern, albeit at a less democratic level. The impact of diffusion from the 
UK is more discernable for the more volatile current and former colonies of occupation, which 
are all significant in the center-periphery direction.  
In both figures, the coefficients that attain significance are overwhelmingly positive, 
which means that the predominant tendency within colonial networks is toward convergence in 
levels of electoral democracy. In Figure 2, positive coefficients signify convergence in levels of 
democracy because colonizers are usually more democratic than their colonies. A positive gap 
times a positive coefficient yields a positive expected effect: in Figure 2, a “pull up” effect of the 
center on the periphery. The greater the democracy gap between colonizer and colony, the 
faster the colony moved toward democracy compared to similar countries that never had 
colonies. In Figures 3a and 3b, positive coefficients indicate convergence for the opposite 
reason: a negative gap between colonizer and colony times a positive coefficient predicts a 
decline in the colonizers’ level of electoral democracy, or a “pull down” effect of the center on 
the periphery.20 
Nevertheless, the overall pattern of convergence or divergence does not require that 
every coefficient be statistically significant, because the pattern depends on the coefficients for 
both directions in a given network, such as the impact of Britain on its former settler colonies 
and the impact of those colonies on Britain. We can identify the net tendencies by adding the 
pair of coefficients for each network and testing for the significance of the sum. If the sum is 
negative and significant, it diverges; if the sum is positive and significant, it converges. To clarify 
the net tendencies, Table 3 reports all the colonial diffusion coefficients by network and their 
sums. Significant coefficients are in bold. There are seven networks for which the sum is not 
significant despite one or both coefficients in the pair being significant because a positive 
coefficient in effect cancels out a negative one.  
In nine of the eleven significant networks, the net tendency is to converge. This is the 
tendency in all of the former long-lived colonies of settlement or forced settlement belonging to 
Spain and Portugal, as well as the current Portuguese colonies of forced settlement (Cape Verde 
and São Tomé and Príncipe). There is no significant relationship for the former colonies of the 
																																								 																				
20 There was some concern that our estimates could continue to diverge and produce estimates of electoral 
democracy that extend beyond the 0-1 range of democracy. To test this, we generated the predicted values of 
change in electoral democracy after running the full selection model and added that to the previous value of 
electoral democracy. This created an expected value of democracy in time t. No observations went beyond the 
upper bound of 1, but 0.6 percent of the observations extended below the lower bound of 0, none lower than         
-0.025. We ran a model correcting for this possibility of infinite divergence and included it in the online appendix 
below as Table A2 and Figure A7 and Figure A8. The results here are largely the same and indicate that infinite 
divergence is not a major issue with our findings.	
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short-lived empires of Germany, Belgium, or Italy, but our model shows significant 
convergence in those networks before independence, when colonial rule was in effect.  
For example, our model finds a virtuous circle in former Spanish colonies of occupation 
(Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, and Peru) and the former Portuguese colony of 
settlement, Brazil. These countries democratized at a faster rate, on average, than comparable 
countries that were never colonies. According to our model, these former colonies were 
pushing Spain and Portugal toward greater electoral democracy while their colonizers were 
pulling them toward greater democracy. If a former colony backslid, its relationship with its 
former colonizer would help it recover. 
Five of the 54 networks are estimated to have negative diffusion, signifying divergence, 
but only one of these is credible. In three of the five (former Spanish colonies of settlement and 
occupation and former Spanish colonies of forced settlement), a negative relationship in one 
direction is canceled out by a positive coefficient in the other direction. In fact, the positive 
coefficient for the impact of former Spanish colonies of forced settlement on Spain is so much 
larger than the impact of Spain on these colonies that the net tendency is significantly positive: 
net convergence. The fourth case of apparent divergence, the periphery-center effect of former 
French colonies of occupation on France, is not credible. The appearance of an effect comes 
from the liberation of France during the Second World War, leading to much improved 
electoral democracy in 1944-1948 compared to 1940 to 1943, during German occupation. This 
improvement clearly had nothing to do with French colonies acting on France. However, the 
fifth case is credible: the impact of current Portuguese colonies of occupation on Portugal. 
Decolonization and democratization were intimately linked in Portugal. The authoritarian 
Estado Nôvo was prolonged in part by its mission to hold onto Portuguese colonies in Africa. 
But within two years of Guinea-Bissau gaining independence in 1973 and Angola and 
Mozambique becoming independent in 1975, Portugal experienced a transition to democracy. 
The Portuguese regime was overthrown in 1974 by military officers opposed to the war to 
maintain control over Portugal’s colonies. This coup launched the Carnation Revolution, which 
culminated in a transition to democracy by 1976. It is plausible that the gap between Portugal 
and these colonies in 1971-75 “pushed up” Portugal’s electoral democracy in 1973-1976: a rare 
case of divergence. 
These estimates may be surprising to those familiar with literature claiming that British 
colonial rule left a positive legacy for democracy or that other empires, such as the Portuguese 
empire in Africa, had negative consequences (Bollen and Jackman 1985 or Bernhard et al. 2004, 
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for example). Our results are different because we use a much larger sample and we 
operationalize democratic diffusion in very different and dynamic way. We can replicate the 
finding of a positive impact of British colonial rule (and a negative one for Portuguese rule) by 
matching their 1965 cross-section and specifying a dummy variable for each empire. But 
running the same model for a 2010 cross-section (still with empire dummies) yields results more 
like the ones we report here. (Figures A13 through A15 in the online appendix are coefficient 
plots of these estimates.) We ran the same model on polyarchy data in five-year intervals from 
1960 to 2010 to replicate the various versions of these models. In these cross-sections, British 
colonization is significant from 1965-1975 and in 1985, but insignificant elsewhere; Spanish 
colonization is significant from 1985 onward. We have more confidence in our large-sample, 
dynamic model that uses a much more precisely calibrated operationalization of democratic 
diffusion. 
 
Comparison with other democracy indices 
As a check on how much our results depend on the choice of V-Dem Electoral Democracy 
Index, Table 4 replicates the colonial networks mixed effects model correcting for selection bias 
but substituting several alternative democracy indicators as the dependent variable and as the 
basis for democracy gaps in the colonial diffusion variables. The alternatives are Polity (Marshall 
et al. 2014), Freedom House (Freedom House 2015), the Unified Democracy Scores (UDS) 
(Pemstein et al. 2010), and Contestation and Inclusiveness (Coppedge et al. 2008). 
The periphery-center part of the analysis shows some real differences. Between 84 to 95 
percent of the coefficients were not significant, compared to 67 percent when using the V-Dem 
data. This discrepancy is probably due in part to differences in sample size. Nevertheless, 73 
percent of the alternative estimates have the same sign and significance as V-Dem coefficients. 
Estimates using Polity and UDS tend to agree with V-Dem the most. Freedom House and 
inclusiveness tended to disagree with the V-Dem estimates the most. Freedom House’s 
estimates presented the greatest difference, perhaps because the sample size was the smallest. 
Inclusiveness measures a different dimension of democracy, hence the high number of 
discrepancies. When considering the center-periphery direction, 35 to 52 percent of the 
coefficients using the alternative dependent variables were not significant, whereas 50 percent 
were insignificant for V-Dem, However, only 64 percent were in agreement with the sign and 
significance of V-Dem’s coefficients. 
Despite the lack of strong agreement across indices, perfect agreement is not expected. 
By design, V-Dem data measure democracy differently. A far more complex analysis would be 
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required to reach a conclusion about which democracy measure gives the most valid and 
reliable results. However, in a looser sense, the alternative indices support the basic conclusions 
about the colonial diffusion relationships: between half and two thirds of them are not 
statistically significant, and almost all (84 percent) of the coefficients that are significant are 
positive, including over 95 percent of center-periphery coefficients. Given that, it is safe to say 
that our finding of democratic divergence in colonial networks is not tied to the choice of V-
Dem Electoral Democracy Index as our main dependent variable of interest. 
 
Conclusion 
Building on Brinks and Coppedge (2006), this paper provides a rigorous analysis of the 
relationship between neighbor networks, colonial networks, and democratization. The research 
design employed here approximates the standards for rigorous causal inference. Fixed-effects 
estimation focuses attention on over-time differences within each country; the two-year 
differenced dependent variable controls for omitted variables that inhibit year-to-year change; 
we distinguish among empires, between current and former colonies, and between opposing 
directions of influence; by specifying 54 diffusion variables in the same model, we are in a 
position of estimating average treatment effects between a great variety of colonial 
relationships, on the one hand, and a fairly comparable reference group of country-years that 
were untouched by the experience of being either a colonizer or a colony; and because the 
reference group is not perfectly comparable, we add corrections for two types of possible 
selection bias. 
Our analysis confirms and extends the Brinks and Coppedge (2006) conclusion that 
“diffusion is no illusion.” Our findings suggest that colonies in certain empires have tended to 
increase their electoral democracy scores at a faster rate than similar countries that were outside 
any colonial network (such as Saudi Arabia and Thailand), and that France, Spain, and Portugal 
have tended to democratize less quickly than similar countries that were outside any colonial 
network (such as the Scandinavian countries and Switzerland). We also find that these forces are 
proportional to the sizes of the electoral democracy gaps between countries in each network, 
and they are more likely to be significant in the oldest and longest-lasting empires. Colonialism 
therefore tends to promote net convergence where it lasts a long time. 
Taken together, these findings suggest that some international forces other than 
immediate neighbors can contribute to the dynamics of democratization. Certainly there are 
powerful domestic forces at play that may be immune to the world outside a country’s borders. 
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But when the outside world matters for democratization, it usually promotes convergence in the 
levels of electoral democracy achieved by colonies and their colonizers. At the same time, 
neighboring countries condition how much former colonies change. Because countries tend to 
become more similar to their neighbors, neighbor networks can accelerate any pressure from a 
colonial network in the same direction or dampen colonial pressure in the opposite direction. 
Other networks of democratic diffusion have yet to be tested: networks of migration, 
information, language, and religion. They promise to provide even more specific clues about the 
causal mechanisms of democratic diffusion than those suggested by colonial networks.  
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Appendix A 
 
Table 1: Baseline Models of Electoral Democracy    
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
    
    
Intercept 0.019* 0.073* 0.002 0.019* 0.058 0.009 -0.019 
 
0.003 0.031 0.034 0.003 0.043 0.006 0.037 
Presidential Election 
Year 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.018*** 0.019** 
 
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 
Year dummies Not shown  
 
  
GDP per capita (log) t-2 -- -0.002 0.005 -- -0.00007 -- -0.007 
  
0.003 0.005  0.004  0.005 
Neighbor Networkt-2 -- -- 0.131*** -- -- 0.126*** 0.144*** 
   0.013   0.013 0.014 
Literacy t-2 -- -- 
-- 
0.0001* 0.0003** 0.0002* 0.0003** 
   
 
0.00006 0.00008 0.0001 0.0001 
        
N 15432 10100 10000 13352 9426 13095 9334 
N-countries 171 153 153 164 149 162 149 
R2-within 0.0412 0.0598 0.1134 0.0462 0.0601 0.0974 0.1191 
R2-between 0.0369 0.0487 0.0031 0.000 0.0036 0.0029 0.0551 
R2-overall 0.0410 0.0592 0.0721 0.4031 0.0505 0.0623 0.0645 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 2: Colonial Network Model of Electoral Democracy, Controlling for 
Selection, Presidential Election Year, Neighbors, Adult Literacy and Year 
Dummies.  
 
Model 4 
Intercept 0.007 
 
0.008 
Presidential Election Year 0.018 *** 
 
0.002 
Adult Literacy 0.0003*** 
 
0.00004 
Neighbors 0.088*** 
 0.005 
Year dummies output suppressed  
 -- 
Center-Periphery, former  
British  Settlement t-2 0.052 
 
0.032 
French  Settlement t-2 0.021 
 
0.040 
Portuguese  Settlement t-2 0.145 *** 
 
0.031 
Spanish  Settlement t-2 0.074*** 
 
0.011 
British  Forced Settlement t-2 0.001 
 
0.025 
French  Forced Settlement t-2 0.008 
 
0.023 
Portuguese  Forced Settlement t-2 0.250*** 
 
0.068 
Spanish  Forced Settlement t-2 -0.028* 
 
0.014 
British  Occupation t-2 0.017** 
 
0.006 
French  Occupation t-2 0.026*** 
 
0.006 
Portuguese  Occupation t-2 0.012 
 
0.015 
Spanish  Occupation t-2 0.064*** 
 
0.007 
Belgian  t-2 0.034 
 
0.019 
German  t-2 0.008 
 0.018 
Italian  t-2 -0.002 
 
0.013 
Dutch  t-2 0.086*** 
 
0.019 
US  t-2 -0.006 
 
0.019 
Center-Periphery, current  
British  Forced Settlement t-2 0.016 
 
0.016 
British  Occupation t-2 0.026*** 
 
0.006 
French  Occupation t-2 0.043*** 
 
0.008 
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Portuguese Occupation 0.018 
 0.044 
Belgian   t-2 0.059** 
 
0.021 
German t-2 -0.031 
 0.130 
Italian  t-2 0.067* 
 
0.030 
Dutch  t-2 0.061*** 
 
0.016 
US  t-2 0.027 
 0.031 
Periphery-Center, former  
British  Settlement t-2 0.063 
 
0.090 
French  Settlement t-2 0.264** 
 
0.083 
Portuguese  Settlement t-2 -0.057 
 
0.050 
Spanish  Settlement t-2 -0.070* 
 
0.035 
British  Forced Settlement t-2 -0.029 
 
0.085 
French  Forced Settlement t-2 -0.206** 
 
0.067 
Portuguese  Forced Settlement t-2 0.014 
 
0.084 
Spanish  Forced Settlement t-2 0.135*** 
 
0.039 
British  Occupation t-2 0.051 
 
0.057 
French  Occupation t-2 0.206** 
 
0.067 
Portuguese  Occupation t-2 0.031 
 
0.049 
Spanish  Occupation t-2 -0.109* 
 
0.050 
Belgian   t-2 -0.004 
 
0.021 
German   t-2 0.019 
 
0.025 
Italian   t-2 -0.021 
 
0.017 
Dutch   t-2 0.027 
 
0.021 
US   t-2 -0.044 
 
0.026 
 
Periphery-Center, current  
British  Forced Settlement t-2 -0.051 
 
0.068 
Portuguese  Forced Settlement t-2 4.531*** 
 
0.713 
British  Occupation t-2 -0.006 
 
0.048 
French  Occupation t-2 -0.021 
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0.028 
Portuguese  Occupation t-2 -4.352*** 
 
0.678 
Belgian   t-2 0.039 
 
0.023 
German   t-2 0.252 
 0.125 
Italian   t-2 0.056 
 
0.032 
Dutch   t-2 0.036 
 
0.023 
US   t-2 0.012 
 0.030 
Random Effects Variance Components  
Colony Selection Variance 2.11×10-17 
 8.44x10-17 
Colonizer Selection Variance 1.43x10-6 
 1.06x10-6 
Constant Variance 0.0001 
 0.00004 
Residual Variance 0.0043 
 0.00005 
  
N 13105 
N-countries 162 
Wald χ2 1578.09 
Prob > χ2 0.000 
Log-Likelihood  17018.772 
Standard errors below estimates.  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 3: Significant Tendencies by Colonial Network 
 
Network 
Center-
Peri
pher
y 
Periphery-
Cent
er 
Net 
tend
ency 
Tendency 
Colonies of Settlement 
former French 0.021 0.264 0.285 convergence 
former British 0.052 0.063 0.115   
former Spanish 0.074 -0.070 0.004  
former 
Portuguese 0.145 -0.057 0.088  
Colonies of Forced Settlement 
former French 0.008 -0.206 -0.198 divergence 
current British 0.016 -0.051 -0.035   
former British 0.001 -0.029 -0.028   
former 
Portuguese 0.249 0.014 0.263 convergence  
former Spanish -0.028 0.135 0.107  convergence 
current 
Portuguese -- 4.531 4.531 convergence 
Colonies of Occupation 
current 
Portuguese 0.018 -4.351 -4.333 divergence 
former Italian -0.002 -0.021 -0.023   
former US -0.006 -0.044 -0.05   
current Dutch 0.061 0.036 0.097 convergence 
current French 0.043 -0.021 0.022  
former 
Portuguese 0.012 0.031 0.043   
former British 0.017 0.051 0.068  
current British 0.026 -0.006 0.020  
former German 0.008 0.019 0.027   
current US 0.027 0.012 0.039   
former Belgian 0.034 -0.004 0.030   
former Spanish 0.064 -0.109 -0.045  
former Dutch 0.086 0.027 0.113 convergence 
current Belgian 0.058 0.039 0.097 convergence 
current German -0.031 0.252 0.221  
current Italian 0.067 0.056 0.123 convergence  
former French 0.026 0.206 0.232 convergence  
Bold = Significant at .05 level 
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Figure 1: Comparison of Neighbor Networks and Colonial Networks 
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Former	Colonial	Networks	
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Figure 2: 
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Figure 3a: with Current Portuguese networks 
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Figure 3b: omitting current Portuguese networks to zoom in on other networks 
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Table 4: Replication with Alternative Democracy Indices 
 
Center-Periphery Periphery-Center 
Network V-Dem 
UD
S Contest 
F
H Inclusiveness Polity 
V-
Dem 
UD
S Contest FH Inclusiveness Polity 
Settlement     
 
                 
former British 0 + 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
former French 0 0 0 0 0 0 + + 0 0 0 + 
former Portuguese + + + 0 0 + 0 0 0 0 + 0 
former Spanish + + + + + + - 0 - 0 0 0 
Forced Settlement                       
current British 0 0 0   0   0 0 0   0   
former British 0 0 0 + 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
former French 0 + + + 0 +  - 0 0 0 0 0 
current Portuguese           +          
former Portuguese + + + + 0 + 0 0 0 0 0 0 
former Spanish - 0 0 - + 0 + 0 0 + 0 +   
Occupation                       
current British + + 0   0 + 0 0 0   0 0 
former British + + + + + + 0 0 0 0 0 0 
current French + 0 0 
 
0   0 0 0 0 0 0 
former French + + + + + + + 0 0 0 0 0 
current Portuguese 0 
    
  - - - - 0   
former Portuguese 0 + + + + + 0 0 - + 0 0 
former Spanish + + + + + + - 0 0 0 0 0 
current Belgian + 0 0   0   0 0 0   0   
former Belgian 0 + + + + + 0 0 0 0 0 0 
current German 0   
 
      +   
 
  
 
  
former German 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
current Italian +   
 
      0   
 
  
 
  
former Italian 0 0 + 0 + + 0 0 0 0 0 0 
current Dutch +        + 0       0 
former Dutch + + + + + + 0 0 0 0 0 0 
current US 0        0 0       0 
former US 0 0 0 0 + 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
% agreement with V-Dem 62 67 65 52 75 
 
77 73 68 64 81 
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Appendix B 
 
Table A1: First Stage Selection Probit Models 
 
Colonizer Selection Colony Selection 
   Intercept 250.72*** 1.91 
 
68.19 1.20 
Latitude 2.98** -7.10** 
 
0.89 2.32 
Great Power Since 1815 1.80** -1.49* 
 
0.68 0.65 
Island Country -1.05 2.28*** 
 
0.62 0.46 
Elevation -0.0013 -0.0008** 
 
0.0007 0.0003 
First Year  -0.13*** -- 
 0.04  
Percent in Tropics -- -1.17 
  
0.67 
Neighbors Colony -- 2.36*** 
  
0.46 
   
N 19772 19772 
N-countries 172 172 
Prob>χ2 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 .5360 .6571 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Figure A1: 
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Figure A2: 
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Figure A3:  
	
	
Figure A3 presents the center-periphery coefficients from the selection model with three year 
lagged diffusion variables and three year differenced dependent variable. This is one year greater 
than our main model and illustrates similar results. 
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Figure A4:  
 
Figure A4 presents the periphery-center coefficients from the same model as Figure A3. The 
results are similar to the two-year lagged model. Omits current Portugal for legibility. 
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Figure A5:  
	
Figure A5 presents the full selection model with one year lagged diffusion variables and a one 
year differenced dependent variable. This is one year less than our main model and produces 
similar results. 
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Figure A6:  
 
 
Figure A6 is the same model as Figure A5 above but with Periphery-Center coefficients. Similar results 
hold as with two year lags. Omits current Portugal for legibility reasons. This illustrates combined with 
previous three plots that our results are not the result of arbitrarily picking a lag point, but robust to 
different lag structures.  
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Table A2: Colonial Network Model of Electoral Democracy, Controlling for 
Selection, Presidential Election Year, Neighbors, Adult Literacy and Year 
Dummies – Transformed DV to Control for Infinite Divergence.  
Intercept 0.002 
 
0.008 
Presidential Election Year 0.010*** 
 
0.018 
Adult Literacy 0.0005*** 
 
0.0003 
Neighbors 0.613*** 
 0.034 
Year dummies Output Suppressed  
 -- 
Center-Periphery, former  
British  Settlement t-2 -0.031 
 
0.245 
French  Settlement t-2 0.192 
 
0.308 
Portuguese  Settlement t-2 0.720 ** 
 
0.243 
Spanish  Settlement t-2 0.525*** 
 
0.088 
British  Forced Settlement t-2 -0.067 
 
0.174 
French  Forced Settlement t-2 -0.092 
 
0.156 
Portuguese  Forced Settlement t-2 0.899 
 
0.495 
Spanish  Forced Settlement t-2 -0.144 
 
0.106 
British  Occupation t-2 0.022 
 
0.038 
French  Occupation t-2 0.026 
 
0.041 
Portuguese  Occupation t-2 -0.036 
 
0.108 
Spanish  Occupation t-2 0.043*** 
 
0.054 
Belgian  t-2 0.327** 
 
0.126 
German  t-2 -0.017 
 0.118 
Italian  t-2 -0.115 
 
0.089 
Dutch  t-2 0.277* 
 
0.135 
US  t-2 -0.120 
 
0.134 
Center-Periphery, current  
British  Forced Settlement t-2 0.011 
 
0.113 
British  Occupation t-2 0.077 
 
0.040 
French  Occupation t-2 0.154** 
 
0.056 
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Portuguese Occupation t-2 .162 
 .300 
Belgian   t-2 0.685*** 
 
0.146 
German t-2 -0.363 
 0.988 
Italian  t-2 0.507* 
 
0.218 
Dutch  t-2 0.252* 
 
0.117 
US  t-2 0.210 
 0.134 
Periphery-Center, former  
British  Settlement t-2 0.319 
 
0.691 
French  Settlement t-2 1.519* 
 
0.637 
Portuguese  Settlement t-2 -0.180 
 
0.389 
Spanish  Settlement t-2 -0.301 
 
0.251 
British  Forced Settlement t-2 -0.221 
 
0.656 
French  Forced Settlement t-2 -0.672 
 
0.518 
Portuguese  Forced Settlement t-2 -0.099 
 
0.648 
Spanish  Forced Settlement t-2 0.820** 
 
0.295 
British  Occupation t-2 0.286 
 
0.432 
French  Occupation t-2 0.564 
 
0.509 
Portuguese  Occupation t-2 0.255 
 
0.365 
Spanish  Occupation t-2 -0.721 
 
0.386 
Belgian   t-2 0.128 
 
0.161 
German   t-2 0.101 
 
0.178 
Italian   t-2 -0.053 
 
0.129 
Dutch   t-2 0.101 
 
0.022 
US   t-2 -0.331 
 
0.185 
 
Periphery-Center, current  
British  Forced Settlement t-2 -0.411 
 
0.529 
Portuguese  Forced Settlement t-2 21.428*** 
 
5.536 
British  Occupation t-2 0.070 
 
0.371 
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French  Occupation t-2 -0.044 
 
0.214 
Portuguese  Occupation t-2 -20.363*** 
 
5.260 
Belgian   t-2 0.171 
 
0.169 
German   t-2 1.311 
 0.932 
Italian   t-2 0.426 
 
0.246 
Dutch   t-2 0.085 
 
0.162 
US   t-2 0.003 
 0.224 
Random Effects Variance Components  
Colony Selection Variance 2.68×10-14 
 8.71x10-13 
Colonizer Selection Variance 8.71x10-14 
 2.92x10-11 
Constant Variance 0.005 
 0.001 
Residual Variance 0.258 
 0.003 
  
N 13083 
N-countries 162 
Wald χ2 1304.39 
Prob > χ2 0.000 
Log-Likelihood  -9775.4343 
Standard errors below estimates.  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Figure A7: 
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Figure A8: 
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Figure A9: 
 
 
The mode presented in Figure A9 utilizes the lagged and logged GDP per capita measure that 
reduces the sample size as discussed in footnote 18, and illustrates that the results remain similar.  
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Figure A10:  
 
 
Same as model A9 above, but the periphery-center coefficients. The results largely remain the 
same but fewer coefficients are significant.  
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Figure A11:  
 
Figure A11 presents the center-periphery coefficients from the second model discussed in 
footnote 13 that uses lagged urbanization instead of adult literacy to proxy GDP per capita. The 
results largely remain the same.  
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Figure A12:  
 
Figure A12 presents the periphery-center coefficients from the same model as Figure A12. 
Results remain similar.  
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Figure A13: 
 
 
Figure A13 predicts the level of polyarchy in 2010 by colonial heritage controlling for GDP 
growth and GDP per capita. Only Spanish colonial heritage is positive and significant.  
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Figure A14:  
 
Figure A14 is an OLS model predicting polyarchy in 1965 by colonial . Replication of original 
finding by Bollen and Jackman. British colonization positively correlated with levels of polyarchy 
in 1965, whereas Portuguese colonization is negative correlated. Unsurprisingly, Spanish 
colonization no longer significant.21 These findings replicate the original Bollen and Jackman 
findings and illustrate the V-V-Dem electoral democracy measure is largely comparable to other 
indicators of democracy. 
 
 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
21 We ran the same model on polyarchy data in 5 year intervals from 1960 to 2010 to replicate the various versions 
of these models. British colonization is significant from 1965-1975 and in 1985, but insignificant elsewhere. Spanish 
colonization is significant from 1985 onward.  
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Figure A15: 
 
 
OLS model predicting 2010 polyarchy scores by colony type. As expected given previous research, 
settlement colonies are positive and significant. Spanish and Portuguese colonies largely follow the 
pattern across all types seen in the diffusion model.22  
 
																																								 																				
22 Similar to the colonizer identity OLS models, we ran similar models for 5-year intervals back to 1965 to replicate 
versions of this model. They are available upon request.	
